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TRANSFER OF PRISONERS TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the development of the prison system
in America in the early 19th century, prisons have
been ruled with an iron hand by administrative
officials.' Prison administrators have historically
exercised what many legal scholars characterize as
autocratic discretion.2 The judiciary's traditional
"hands-off" policy of deference to prison authori-
ties' supposed expertise has significantly contrib-
uted to this development.
3
The transfer of inmates within the penal system
is no exception to this arbitrary discretion.. Specif-
ically, the transfer of prisoners from the general
prison population to mental hospitals for the crim-
inally insane has been considered, until very re-
cently, a purely administrative determination be-
yond judicial scrutiny.5 Moreover, the autocratic
power of prison administrators in the field of crim-
inal commitment' is statutorily authorized in the
vast majority of states. Despite recent advances in
the legal rights of the mentally disturbed,7 the
statutory law of criminal commitment has gener-
I D. RUDOVSKY, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 11-12
(1973).
2 See, e.g., Hirschkop, The Rights of Prisoners, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 451 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); Note,
The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisoners: A New Look at Due
Process for Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 1277 (1975)..
3 D. RUYovSKY. supra note 1, at 12-16: Note, Beyond
the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAt.E L. J. 506 (1963).
'See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), and
Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), discussed at
length in note 25 infra.
sSee notes I 11-15 and accompanying text infra.
6 The term 'criminal commitment' is herein used to
describe the involuntary transfer of prison inmates to
mental institutions, and is to be contrasted with the term
'civil commitment' which is herein used to describe the
commitment of civilians to such institutions. While the
commitment of those found incompetent to stand trial
and those found innocent of criminal charges by reason
of insanity are criminally related commitments, such
commitments are not included within the term 'criminal
commitment.'
7 The mentally ill have recently been afforded a mul-
titude of procedural protections in their initial commit-
ment, periodic review of their need for further confine-
ment, and more rigorous protection of their substantive
rights during confinement. For detailed explication of
thi: development see B. ENNIS. PRISONERS OF PSYCHIA-
TRY (1972), and B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEl., THE RIGH'rs Of:
MENITAl. PAt'iENrrS (1973).
ally lagged far behind. Criminal commitment pro-
cedures in most states remain a matter of admin-
istrative discretion and convenience.
9
In Arkansas, for example, when a prison staff
physician (who need not even be trained in psy-
chology or psychiatry) ascertains that a prisoner is
mentally ill and certifies this finding to the warden
of the prison, it becomes the warden's du4, to
8 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d
1071, 1083 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
" The criminal commitment procedures in thirty-three
of the fifty-two jurisdictions surveyed (the fifty states plus
the District of Columbia and the United States federal
statute) are deplorably unprotective of the prisoners'
interests. See, Ai-A. CODE tit. 22, §§ 52-70 to 72 (1975);
ARK. Siwr. ANN. § 59-415 (1971); CAL PENAl. CODE
§§ 2684-2685 (Supp. 1978): Coi.o. REV. SrA'I. §§ 27-23-
101 (Supp. 1976); DEl.. CODE tit., § 6525 (1974); Fi,
S'-r. § 945.12 (1971); GA. CODE § 77-310(d) (1973);
HAW. REv. S'A1'. § 334-74 (1976); IDIHO ComE §§ 66-
335, 66-1304(d) (1973), 66-1306; IOWA CODE § 247-16
(Supp. 1977-78); KAN. SrAT. § 75-5209 (Supp. 1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 202A-190 (1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 123 § 18 (Michie Law. Co-op Supp. 1977); MINN.
Srxr. § 241.07 (1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-120
(Supp. 1977); Mo. RFV. S'rAr. § 552.050 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. S'rxl § 83-180 (1976): NEV. REV. STrr. §
433A.450 (1975); N.H. REV. S';wr. § 607:4 (1955); O1iio
REV. CODE ANN. § 5125.05 (Page 1974); OKiA. Srxr.
ANN. 43A § 61 (West 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 26-4-6
(Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPII.EI) LAWS ANN. § 24-2-24
(Supp. 1977); TEx. CRIM. PRO CODE tit. 46.01, § 2
(Vernon Supp. 1966-67); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-63a-2
(Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 19.2-177 (1977); WASH. REV.
CODE § 72.68.031 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. ComE § 28-5-31
(1971); 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241 (West 1976).
By contrast, the procedures in sixteen of the remaining
seventeen states are quite procedurally protective of the
prisoners' interests, in many cases providing for civil
commitment procedures. See, ARIz. REV. S'rAT. § 31-224
(1977); CONN. GE.N. Srxr. ANN. § 17-194c et seq. (West
Supp. 1977); I.I.. REV. STrAT. ch. 38 § 1003-8-5 (1975);
LA. REV. STwAT. ANN. § 28:59 (West 1975): MiE. RE',
S'rAr. tit. 34, § 136-A (1978); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §
14-800 (1000) et seq. (1976); N.J. S'rAi. ANN. § 30:4-82
(West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 40 (McKinney
Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-85 (1974): OR. R-V.
S'rir. §§ 179,473. 179.476(1) (1977); 50 PA. CONS. SrAI.
§ 7401 (Purdon Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 44-23-210
(Supp. 1977); TENN. ConE ANN. § 33-705 (1977); VT.
Srxr. ANN. tit. 28, § 703 (1977); Wis. S'irA. § 51.21(3)
(West 1957); 24 D.C. CODE § 302 (1973). The Indiana
procedures are also quite protective of the prisoners'
interests. However, judicial hearing is not provided for
only an administrative hearing before a hearing officer.
See IND. CoDE ANN. § 16-14-8-1 et seq. (Burns 1973).
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transfer that prisoner to the state hospital until
"reason be ... restored."' 0 The South Dakota crim-
inal commitment statute presents another glaring
example of the ease by which a prisoner can be
summarily transferred from his prison cell to a
state mental institution. That statute provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the
warden and the board of charities and corrections,
that any person confined in the penitentiary ... has
become mentally ill ... the board may order that
such person be taken from the penitentiary and be
confined and treated in one of the state hospitals
for the mentally ill ... and upon his recovery there-
from, if before the expiration of his sentence, that
he be returned to the penitentiary."
California has a similar criminal commitment
statute. In that state, a prisoner may be committed
if, in the opinion of the Director of Corrections, the
prisoner is mentally ill and his "rehabilitation ...
may be expedited by treatment at any one of the
state hospitals .... ,12 These three criminal com-
mitment statutes aie typical of those found in most
states.
This broad administrative discretion has often
produced catastrophic results. For example, in Den-
nison v. State,13 the claimant, Dennison, was con-
victed in 1926 of stealing $5 worth of candy from
a roadside stand and was sentenced to ten years in
prison. However, after serving slightly more than
one year of that term, he was certified insane by a
prison staff physician. Solely on the basis of that
certification, and without any notice or hearing,
prison officials transferred Dennison to Naponoch,
a state mental asylum described as "a repository
for unfortunates of varying degrees of imbecility,
idiocy and moronity.'
14
As a result of his criminal commitment, Denni-
son's institutional confinement extended far be-
yond his original ten year prison sentence. In fact,
he spent an additional 24 years in institutional
custody merely on the basis of a prison staff phy-
sician's opinion that he was a "low grade moron.
15
The court however found this opinion to be a
"tragic error,' 6 and noted that Dennison had been
sane at the time of his commitment.' 7
"'ARK Srvr. ANN § 59-415 (1971).
"S.D. CoMpiuViD LAXs ANN. §24-2-24 (Supp. 1977).
' CAI. PENAl. CODE § 2684 (West Supp. 1978).
13 49 Misc. 2d 533, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
'4 Id. at 536. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
is Id. at 535, 267 NY.S.2d at 922.
'
t Id. at 536, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
'7 In fact, the court found that Dennison's confinement
at Napanoch itself "caused" him to become insane. Id. at
537, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
Dennison graphically illustrates the need for rig-
orous procedural safeguards governing the transfer
of prison inmates to mental institutions. When
commitment is a routine matter of administrative
paper work and rubber stamps, the rights of indi-
viduals are severely jeopardized. Preservation of
these rights, then, is more than a matter of human
decency, it is a mandate of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Con-
stitution.
CRIMINAL COMMITMENT AND THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE
The Analytical Framework
Modern procedural due process analysis is a
bifurcated inquiry. First, the court must determine
whether there has been a deprivation of sufficient
magnitude to warrant application of the due proc-
ess clause, that is, the court must question whether
there has been such a "grievous loss" as to trigger
due process.' 8 Second, "[o]nce it is determined that
due process applied, the question remains what
process is due."' 9 The answer to this question de-
pends on the peculiar factual circumstances of the
individual case and the requirements of procedural
due process apply only to the deprivation of inter-
ests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's




Does Due Process Apply?
Liberty, which is the particular fourteenth
amendment interest most directly involved in crim-
inal commitment proceedings, has been given an
expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court:
While this Court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty ... guaranteed [by the due
process clause], the term ... [wlithout doubt ...
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
's Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
'9 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
" Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 569. Roth concerned a state university's decision not to
rehire a non-tenured professor after his one year term of
faculty appointment had expired. The Court noted that
although the professor's interests in re-employment with
the university may have been a major concern to him,
that was not enough. 25[T]o determine whether due proc-
ess requirements apply in the first place, we must look
not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake.... We must look to see if the interest is within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and prop-
erty." Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
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cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized




As defined by the Court, the concept of liberty
has been held to include instances wherein a "per-
son's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing
to him .... 22 In these situations the deprivation
of liberty consists of damage to the individual's
"standing and associations in his community.' ' 3
Similarly, the state deprives an individual of his
liberty by imposing upon him "a stigma or other
disability that forecloses his freedom to take advan-
tage of other employment opportunities. 2 4
Unlike a transfer from one prison to another,
which the Supreme Court has recently held to be
an insufficient deprivation to trigger due process,'
commitment of a prison inmate to a mental insti-
21 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
2 Wisconsin v. Constatineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971).
23 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 573.
2 Id.
25 In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), inmates
who were transferred from minimum security prisons to
other prisons "the conditions of which [were] substan-
tially less favorable to the prisoner ... " [id. at 216],
challenged their transfer on due process grounds. They
alleged that the administrative hearings which they had
been afforded were procedurally deficient because they
had not been allowed the right to confront adverse
witnesses. The Court, however, held that the interprison
transfer did not constitute a deprivation of sufficient
magnitude to implicate the due process clause, noting:
Similarly, we cannot agree that any change in the
conditions of confinement having a substantial ad-
verse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient
to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause by its own force forbids the
State from convicting any person of crime and
depriving him of his liberty without complying fully
with the requirements of the Clause. But given a
valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been
constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent
that the State may confine him and subject him to
the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions
of confinement do not otherwise violate the Consti-
tution. The Constitution does not ... guarantee
that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any
particular prison ... The conviction has sufficiently
extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to em-
power the State to confine him in any of its prisons
[emphasis in original].
Id. at 224.
See also, Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976),
decided the same day as Meachum and utilizing the same
rationale, holding that a prisoner may legally be trans-
ferred from one prison to another without a hearing at
all, even though the transfer resulted in significantly
burdensome consequences for the prisoner.
tution is accompanied by a host of deleterious
consequences of sufficient magnitude to implicate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 26 Liberty in its fullest sense is at stake in
criminal commitment proceedings. Through such
proceedings, freedom from bodily constraints, from
mental and emotional oppression, and from dam-
age to reputational interests is put in jeopardy.
The first jeopardy to freedom is that criminal
commitment results in the imposition of signifi-
cantly more onerous physical restraints. The pris-
oner is invariably placed in a maximum security
ward27 where his freedom of movement within the
institution is greatly diminished.28 His actions are
constantly monitored and controlled,29 and he is
subjected to "restrictions and routines ... which
differ significantly from those in a prison."'3 Rules
and regulations are inherently vague and subject
to ad hoc, discretionary interpretation, alteration,
and 'creation by the hospital staff. Consequently,
the individual is without adequate notice of the
activities which lead to punitive measures."1
26 Indeed, the court in Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp.
1190, (N.D., W. Va. 1976), held that before a prisoner
may be transferred from prison to a state mental insti-
tution he must be afforded substantially all the proce-
dural safeguards utilized in civil commitment proceed-
ings. It distinguished Meachum and Montayne noting:
[A] transfer from a state prison to a state mental
hospital is substantially different from a transfer
from one state prison to another. The grievous loss
to a prisoner involved in a transfer to the mental
hospital is not merely "any grievous loss," as the
Meachum Court described deprivations involved in
intrastate prison transfers.... Rather, it is suffi-
ciently onerous to require the imposition of proce-
dural protections.
Id. at 1192-93.
27 Wexler and Scovilla, The Administration of Psychiatric
Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 3 ARIZ. L. REv. 1,
187-88 (1971).
2' United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d
1071, 1078, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847
(1969). In addition the court noted, in the appendix to
its opinion, some thirty-five specific ways in which restric-
tions of the mental institution were significantly more
onerous than the corresponding rules of the prison. These
included such items as the scheduling and types of meals
served, regularity of rules and procedures, types of
"guarding" utilized, personal clothing and hygiene al-
lowed, and mail privileges.
' See Developments in the Law-Civil Confmitment of the
Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. R .v. 1190, 1194-96, 1358-65
(1974) ("[such] deprivations of liberty may be necessary
to preserve order and to protect patients from self-in-
flicted injury.").
'iMatthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
31 Id. at 1359-60, Ferleger, Loosing the Chains:In-Hospital
Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW.
447, 456 (1973).
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Additionally, the imposition of institutional dis-
cipline for prohibited activities is much more severe
in a mental hospital than in a prison. Mental
patients may be subjected to beatings for no cause
32
and the use of seclusion, strip cells, and mechanical
restraints (such as strapping the patient to his bed)
are among the myriad of dehumanizing indignities
often imposed for minor "offenses."' 3 Moreover,
much of the "treatment" in mental institutions
constitutes serious invasion of bodily privacy.
Forced injections of drugs, electro-shock treat-
ments, and lobotomies severely debase personal
autonomy and are still in widespread use.'
Commitment to a mental institution also curtails
the prisoner's physical liberty because it may ex-
tend the length of his incarceration. In Baxstrom v.
Herold,5 the Supreme Court held that a transferred
prisoner cannot be confined in a mental institution
beyond the end of his prison sentence unless he is
formally committed under a state civil commit-
ment statute or similarly protective procedures.
Despite Baxstrom, though, the prisoner may still lose
the opportunity for early release through the parole
and "good time" systems employed by the state
prisons. In some states, parole is statutorily una-
"'2 Rosenhan, On Being Sane In Insane Places, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 379 (1973). Professor Rosenhan conducted
an experiment under which eight sane people were se-
cretly admitted to mental institutions in order to test
whether their sanity could be detected by the hospital
staff and psychiatrists. In describing and interpreting the
outcome of this experiment, Professor Rosenhan noted:
I have records of patients who were beaten by staff
for the sin of having initiated verbal contact. During
my own experience [Professor Rosenhan was one of
those secretly admitted], for example, one patient
was beaten in the presence of other patients for
having approached an attendant and told him, "I
like you." Occasionally punishment meted out
seemed so excessive that it could not be justified by
the most radical interpretations of psychiatric
canon. Nevertheless, they appeared to go unques-
tioned.
Id. at 394. It should be noted that these hospitals were
considered progressive. The conditions existing in maxi-
mum security wards must therefore be significantly
worse.
3 Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D. Conn.
1974), affd, 508 F.2d 836 (1975); Ferleger, supra note 31,
at 447-49, 483-93.
3 See Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, On theJusti-
fications for Civil Commitment, 117 PA. L. REv. 75, 94-95
(1968); Ferleger, supra note 31, at 469-71, 473-77; Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 30, at 1194-96; Note, Due
Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil
Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. R-v 633, 645-46
(1967).
35 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See pp. 26-28 infra.
vailable to prisoners who have been committed.36
Even where parole is not statutorily precluded,
parole boards are extremely reluctant to grant
parole to committed prisoners and the practical
result is the same as if there were a statutory
preclusion.3 7 This lost opportunity for parole may
itself constitute a sufficient deprivation of liberty
to implicate the due process clause. The Supreme
Court has held that an individual must be afforded
due process prior to the revocation of parole's or
probation.39 More specifically, other courts have
held that the denial of parole is a sufficient depri-
vation of liberty to warrant observance of due
process in parole determinations." Thus, since
committed prisoners lose the opportunity for early
release through parole, criminal commitment
should be considered so grievous of a loss as to
warrant invocation of the due process clause.
Furthermore, the committed prisoner's period of
incarceration may well be extended beyond the
expiration of his prison sentence as a result of his
transfer to a mental institution. Civil commitment
of a prisoner who is already confined in a mental
institution is little more than a rubber stamp pro-
ceeding, despite the application of rigorous proce-
dural safeguards. The civil commitment determi-
nation, whether made by judge or jury, hinges
almost exclusively on psychiatric expert testi-
mony.4 The psychiatrist's determination is likely
to be a foregone conclusion based exclusively on
his preconceived belief that a currently committed
6 See, e.g., MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. § 38,501 and
N.J. REv. SiA. § 30:4-107.
37 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at
1076; Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d at 611; Chesney v.
Adams, 377 F. Supp. at 893; Wexler and Scoville, supra
note 27, at 184 (in Arizona the transferred prisoner loses
certain "good time" benefits).
3o Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
4o Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1971),
vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Franklin v. Shields,
399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037
(1975).
41 The Wexler and Scoville study, supra note 27, at 60,
demonstrates that the psychiatrist's "recommendation is
probably the single most important factor in the com-
mitment decision," noting that it was followed by either
the judge orjury in 96.1% to 97.9% of the cases surveyed.
"This extraordinary correlation, coupled with data
gleaned from interviews with judges throughout the state
[Arizona], can lead to only one conclusion-nearly total
reliance is placed on the recommendations of the physi-
cian." Id. Accord: B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY
(1972); L. LINN. A HANDBOOK OF HosPIrAL PSYCHIA-
rTy: A PRACTICAL GUIDEr-O THERAPY (1955).
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prisoner must be mentally ill.42 Therefore, the
prison administrators' initial commitment decision,
which ostensibly is to last no longer than the
prisoner's sentence, is often dispositive of the pris-
oner's situation for a much longer period. In many
42 T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBEWITY, AND PSYCHIATRY 59
(1963); Id. at 171 (quoting Overholser v. DeMarcos, 149
F.2d 23, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.)), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945):
[I]t is not the function oftheJudge in habeas corpus
proceedings to determine the mental condition of a
person who has been committed for insanity....
[III should be remembered that persons committed... are
presumed to be insane... There is also a presumption that
the hospital staff are competent ... and that their opinion
... is correct. Their determination that a petitioner
should not be at large ... must not be lightly
disregarded.... The issue which must ultimately be
decided is whether he has sufficiently recovered
from a mental disease, so that he may be safely
released. Lay judgment on such an issue is of little
value. If, despite the judgment of the hospital staff
that the petitioner has not recovered, there is a
substantial doubt on the question, it becomes the
duty of the court to see that a new judgment on the
petitioner's sanity is made according to the proce-
dure laid down in the District of Columbia code.
This procedure requires an examination and report
by the Commission on Mental Health [italics
added].
Rosenhan, supra note 32, at 388 ("Given that the patient
is in the hospital, he must be psychologically disturbed.");
Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 202 (Several psy-
chology graduate students were secretly placed in a men-
tal institution in order to observe the conditions existing
in the institution first hand. One of them made the
following observation regarding his inability to convince
the hospital staff of his sanity and true identity:
It was about one o'clock in the morning before
the technicians were finally able to sit down and
talk with me. I began by telling them who I was
and why I (vas there. Nothing had prepared me for
their response: "Tell us more about your delusions!"
In my initial shock, I became obviously and overtly
confused, merely adding more to the "clinical pic-
ture" of their newest patient. I began to be filled,
indeed swept, with all kinds of feelings. First was a
paranoia about my own state. If the technicians
really thought I was a patient, perhaps I would
have difficulty getting out, a point about which Dr.
Levy had been particularly reticent. But even more
was an anger combined with a sense of disbelief and
pity for those who really were there. I had done
nothing throughout the day to allow the technicians
to suspect even remotely that I had any psycholog-
ical problems except present myself to the hospital.
And it suddenly occurred to me that this was the ultimate
criterion ifyou were here in a mental hospital there must be
something wrong withyou. But, not only was there not
enough wrong with me to require hospitalization,
there was equally little wrong with many of the
patients that I saw on our ward.
Id. (emphasis added).
instances the prisoner remains committed for the
rest of his life.4" Consequently, the initial conimit-
ment of a prisoner must be considered more than
a mere administrative transfer from one penal
facility to another.
The second jeopardy to freedom is that criminal
commitment endangers the individual's liberty, as
that term is used in due process analysis, by sub-
jecting the individual to severe mental and emo-
tional stress and oppression. Mental patients are
frequently drugged into docility44-a constant state
of apathy nothing short of mental oppression.
4
5
The patient is thus deprived of the freedom of his
own imagination and creative though t.
4
6
The pacifistic effect of these tranquilizing drugs
on the individual's will to resist4 7 deprives the
patient of the very essence of his humanity and his
intellect.
Moreover, the very nature of institutional psy-
chiatry, as practiced in the United States today,
"There is repetitive evidence that once a patient has
remained in a large mental hospital for two yeairs or
moie, he is quite unlikely to leave 6xcept by death. He
becomes one'o the large'mass of so-called 'chronic pa-
tients'." United States ex rel. Schuster'v. Herold, 410 F.2d
at 1079.
" See Shaffer, Introduction, Symposium: Mental Illness, The
Law and'Civil Liberties, f3 S.ANTA CtlARA LAw. 369, 370
(1973):
Mental Hospitals are malign, global places. Mental
patients are still beaten, shocked, drugged, or mu-
tilated into submi ssion. Even where these abuses are
controlled, as thiey are probably controlled'today in
mafly places ... the environment and the haze of
drug-induced docility appear to create and confirm
illnesi and deviance rather than 'cure' it.
4"'Medicatfon" (in most cases Thorazine, a highly
potent tranquilizer) is uniformly administered without
any determination of individual need. Wexler and Sco-
ville, supra note 27, at 193. Moreover, it "medication" is
refused by the patient, it ii forcefully administered by
means oftintramsular injection, and the patient is often
punished with secfusion for his refusal. Ferleger, supra
note 31, at 469-73.
4 For example, consider the observations of a clinical
psychology graduate student who, as part "of a project
examining mental health care institutes in the state of
Arizona, was "planted"' in an institution without reveal-
ing his true identity to the hospital staff or to tlhe other
patients:
I spent the morning ... talking to other patients.
One 'oung woman interested me and I attmpted
to learn something about her. This soon became a
very'f"utile attempt, however, for'I found that 'she
was apparently so drugged that she founf it difficult
to carry as much as a single sentencein her thoughts
betore totally losing what I had said."
Wexler and'Scoville, supra note 27, at .203.
47 See Wexler and Scoville, id. at 66-69.
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jeopardizes the individual's psychological auton-
omy. Involuntary institutional psychiatry has come
under attack in the past fifteen years from critics
both within the medical and the legal professions.'
s
Doctor Thomas Szasz is the most caustic and pro-
lific of these critics. The core of his criticism is the
proposition that involuntary institutional psychia-
try has enslaved the individuals it sought to aid,
49
resulting in "psychoauthoritarianism," 50 "thera-
peutic tyrrany,"5 1 and "psychiatric slavery. '5 2 Ac-
cording to Szasz:
Most of the legal and social applications of psychia-
try, undertaken in the name of psychiatric liberal-
ism, are actually instances of despotism. To be sure,
this type of despotism is based on health values, but
it is despotism nonetheless. Why? Because the pro-
moters of mental health do not eschew coercive
methods but, on the contrary, eagerly embrace
them. Just as in democracy, there lurks the danger
of tyranny by the majority, so in mental-health
legislation there lurks the danger of tyranny by
therapy.
... [TIoday psychiatry in the United States is all
too often used to subvert traditional political guar-
anties of individual liberty.' 3
... Scientific knowledge does not contain within
itself directions for its "proper" humanitarian use.54
Szasz maintains that institutional psychiatry has
become a form of social engineering synonymous
with institutional brainwashing. The individual
whose conduct is socially unacceptable is commit-
ted, his behavior is corrected ("treated"), and his
mind is reshaped.5 Mental health is equated with
social and moral goodness, and mental illness with
48 See B. ENNIS. PRISONERS OF PSYCHIAI'RY (1972): R.
LAIN(;. THE POLi I'iCS OF EXPERIENCE (1967), R. LAING
& A. ESI'ERSON. SANITY. MADNESS, AND THE FAMILY
(1964): T. SZASZ. supra note 42, THE MYTH OF MENTAL.
II.LNESS (1961), THE MANUFAOTURE OF MADNESS
(1970), and PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977); Gerbode,
Book Review, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 161 (1973).
49The psychiatric abuses of power have become so
grave, in Szasz's opinion, that "[liberty against psychia-
try" is his suggestion for reform, namely the abolition of
the psychiatric control over involuntary institutionaliza-
tion. T. SZAsZ.supra note 42, at 6. See also, Gerbode, supra
note 48, at 622.
5 T. SZASZ, supra note 42, at 101. (quoting Wertham,
Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 336,
338 (1955).
si Id. at 7.
52 T. SzAsz. PYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977). See also, B.
ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972).
53 T. SZASZ, supra note 42, at vii-viii.
'
4 Id. at 92.
5
" Id. at vii, 4, 39, 43.
social and moral turptitude.' Thus, those who
behave "abnormally," that is in a socially unac-
ceptable manner, 7 are considered mentally ill and
in need of "therapy":
Institutional psychiatry is part of a broad, oid, but
ever new movement to solve problems by eliminat-
ing people who create or carry problems; the "men-
tally ill" like the aged ill, the retarded, and the
unborn, are social nuisances-which tells you noth-
ing about them, but everything about the rest of
58US.
Psychiatrists conceal this inherent conflict of
interest between themselves and their patients' lib-
erty by "cloth[ing commitment] in a mantle of
therapeutic paternalism."' 9 They disguise it with a
"facade of benevolence"' 6 and an alleged interest
in the patients' well-being:
[Clommitment serves the institutional values of psy-
chiatry as a system of social control. Yet, psychiatry
is not explicitly defined as an agency of social
control as, for example, is the police. Its controlling
function is hidden under a facade of medical and
psychiatric jargon, and is buttressed by a self-pro-
claimed desire to help or treat so-called mentally ill
persons.6 1
As a consequence of these factors, the inmate
transferred from a prison to a mental institution
sacrifices psychic liberty for "psychiatric coer-
cion" 2 in the guise of "treatment. "63 This is per-
5 Id. at 3.
5' Id. at 55.
5 Shaffer, supra note 44, at 371-72. See also T. SZASZ.
supra note 42, at 196-97 (the psychiatrist as the "social
tranquilizer"); Gerbode, supra note 48, at 622:
This myth [that mental illness can be defined, di-
agnosed, and cured] provides ajustification for what
is a persistent tendency in societies toward perse-
cuting the unpopular. The road to 1984 begins with
persecution of a minority and ends with persecution
of the majority. The concept of mental illness is
inconsistent with a free society, where even the
weird, unwanted, and troublesome must have the
full protection of the laws. If a person commits
crimes, he should be prosecuted with full legal
safeguards, but if not, he should be free to pursue
whatever existence he chooses. I advocate ... that
we abolish the problem of mental illness by abolish-
ing the concept of mental illness.
'9 T. SZASZ. supra note 42, at 43.
r Id. at 55.
6i Id. at 39.
62 Id. at 6.
63 See Bazelon, Forward, Symposium: Mental Illness, The
Law and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 367, 368
(1973): This cannot be "blamed on the psychiatric profes-
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"haps the most severe deprivation involved in the
commitment of prisoners to mental institutions.
64
Criminal commitment jeopardizes the trans-
ferred prisoner's psychic liberty in still another
manner. It may actually cause insanity or contrib-
ute to an already existing psychiatric disorder. As
one court has stated:
[W]e are faced with the obvious but terrifying pos-
sibility that the transferred prisoner may not be
mentally ill at all. Yet he will be confined with men
who are not only mad, but dangerously so....
[H]e will be exposed to physical, emotional, and
general mental agony. Confined with those who are
insane, told repeatedly that he too is insane and
indeed treated as insane, it does not take much for
a man to question his own sanity and in the end to
succumb to some mental aberration....
[T]here is considerable evidence that a prolonged
commitment in an institution providing only cus-
todial confinement for the "mentally sick" and
nothing more may itself cause serious psychological
harm or exacerbate any pre-existing condition.
6
Evidence indicates that the vast majority of
mental institutions throughout the country, and
virtually all maximum security wards in such in-
stitutions, provide nothing more than custodial
sion. Rather, it reflects society's reluctance to create
adequate social or legal mechanisms to deal with the
problems we dump into psychiatry's lap. We prefer to
assume that by labelling the process 'medical' and its
results 'treatment' we can convert coercion into benevo-
lence and deprivation into help."
6' Indeed, while some scholars have advocated that
mental patients should be recognized as possessing a
constitutional right to treatment, see note 68 infra, others
have taken into consideration this grave psychological
oppression disguised as treatment and have concluded
that courts should instead recognize the patients' consti-
tutional right to refrse treatment. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, at
214-15 (the right to treatment rubric is "both naive and
dangerous," and has been readily accepted in legal and
medical psychiatric circles because it "support[s] the
myth that mental illness is a medical problem that can
be solved by medical means."); Shaffer, supra note 44, at
371.
" United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at
1078-79. See also, Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d at 611;
Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Supp. at 893; Dennison v.
State, 49 Misc. 2d 933, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920, (1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 28 App. Div. 2d 608, 280 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1967),
afi'd23 N.Y.2d 996, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 923 (1970):
The conclusion is inescapable that although the
... [transferred prisoner] did become psychotic after
several years at the ... [state mental hospital], the
psychosis ... was caused by the nature of his con-
finement. In a sense, society labeled him as a sub-
human, placed him in a cage with genuine sub-
confinement. 66 Patients are rarely visited by doc-
tors, and when they are, "therapy" seldom lasts
more than several minutes.67 Moreover, psychiatric
hospitals are so understaffed that it has become
physically impossible to provide adequate treat-
ment.
6 8
[M]ost inmates [of mental institutions] receive little
attention and much abuse, and ... those who are
given any ministration at all are given whatever can
be devised to keep them quiet. The honest rubric
for this ... is protection from the deviant,for society
andfor the family (but not from the family for the
deviant)....
Habilitation (or rehabilitation) is at best a prom-
ise to condition the "patient" into conformity ...
and at worst a benign, hypocritical excuse for con-
tainment.... 69
Clinical studies also support the proposition that
commitment may itself cause or contribute to in-
sanity. Professors Wexler and Scoville found that
psychology graduate students posing as mental
patients experienced psychological pressures in the
institution which caused severe anxiety. If the stu-
dents had not known that their stay was only
humans, drove him insane, and then used his insan-
ity as an excuse for holding him indefinitely in an
institution with few, if any, facilities for genuine
treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill.
66 Morris, Criminality: and the Right to Treatment, 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 784, 790 (1969); Wexler and Scoville, supra
note 27, at 186-88, 200, 202-03, 205-06, 235-36; Com-
ment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Invol-
untaVy Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CnI. L. REV. 633,
634 (1967).
67Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 192-94. Ro-
senhan, supra note 32, at 391-93, 396-97: "Physicians,
especially psychiatrists ... were rarely seen on the wards.
Quite commonly, they would only be seen when they
arrived and departed, with the remaining time being
spent in their offices .... Id at 392.
8 Dixon v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of
Penn., 325 F. Supp. 966, 969 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Courts
and legal scholars have recently noted this gross inade-
quacy of treatment and have concluded that mental
patients are thereby being deprived of their constitutional
right to treatment. The case law and scholarly material
on the right to treatment has become voluminous. See,
e.g., Welsch v. Linkins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State
Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908, (1968); Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 ABAJ. 499 (1960); Katz,
The Right to Treatment, -An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U.
CH. L. REV. 755 (1969); Morris, supra note 66; Symposium
The Right to Treatment, 57 GEORGETOWN L.J. 673 (1969).
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to "Treat-
ment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
69 Shaffer, supra note 44, at 371.
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temporary, these pressures would have undoubt-
edly culminated in insanity.70 " Professor Rosenhan
obtained similar results in a study wherein eight
sane people were secretly admitted to twelve dif-
ferent mental hospitals to determine if the hospital
psychiatrists and staff could detect their sanity.
These individuals uniformly indicated that "[t]he
psychological stresses associated with hospitaliza-
tion were considerable, and all but one of the
pseudopatients desired to be discharged almost
immediately after being admitted." 1
Aside from bodily constraints and emotional
oppression, the final jeopardy to freedom caused
by criminal commitment is the damage commit-
ment does to the individual's reputation. The label
"mentally ill," placed on the prisoner as a result of
his transfer to a mental institution, stigmatizes him
for the rest of his life. Upon release he is "socially
ostracized and victimized by employment and ed-
ucational discrimination."7 2 In effect, the crimi-
nally committed are "'twice-cursed' as both men-
tally ill and criminal .... 7 The general public
simply does not regard the mentally ill in the same
light as they do the physically ill. Mental illness is
7o Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 189-206. One
student had this to say about his experience:
My defense for the very real fears I was feeling was
to become more or less catatonic.... [I] could not
escape physically from my surroundings. So I es-
caped within myself. I probably would have degen-
erated to the state of many of the young patients I
observed, had it not been for the saving knowledge
that I was a short-term visitor and not a semi-
permanent resident. As it was, I found myself trying
to become more and more like the other patients,
trying not to be different in any way.... [I] was
modeling the patient.
Id. at 199.
71 Rosenhan, supra note 32, at 384.
" Developments in the Law, supra note 29, at 1200. The
stigmatic disapprobation that accompanies the label
"mentally ill" has been extensively documented in psy-
chiatric literature. See, e.g., H. FREEMAN. 0. SIMMONS,
THE MENTAL PAIHENT COMES HOME (1963); J. NUN-
NALY, POPULAR CONCEfrIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH
(1961); Cummings & Cummings, On the Stigma of Mental
Illness, I COMM MENI'r. HEALTH J. 135 (1965); Farina
& Ring, The Influence of Perceived Mental Illness of Interper-
sonal Relations, 70 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 47 (1965); Jo-
hanssen, Attitudes Toward Mental Patients: A Review of Em-
pirical Research, 53 MENr. HYGIENE 218 (1969); Sarbin,
On the Futility of the Proposition that Some People be Labelled
"Mentally Ill" 31 J. CONSUIIING PSYCH, 447 (1967);
Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes
of the Public Toward Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSUL & CLINI-
CAL PSYCH. 159 (1970); Steadman & Keveles, The Com-
munity Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Pa-
tients: 1966-1970, 129 AM.J. PSYCH 304 (1972).
73 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at
1073. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An
never considered to be fully cured, 4 and as Rosen-
han notes:
A broken leg is something one recovers from, but
mental illness allegedly endures forever. A broken
leg does not threaten the observer, but a crazy
schizophrenic? There is by now a host of evidence
that attitudes toward the mentally ill arc character-
ized by fear, hostility, aloofness, suspicion, and
dread. The mentally ill are society's lepers.
That such attitudes infect the general population
is perhaps not surprising, only upsetting. But that
they affect the professionals-attendants, nurses,
physicians, phychologists [sic], and social
workers-who treat and deal with the mentally ill
is more disconcerting, both because such attitudes
are self-evidently pernicious and because they are
unwitting. 75
In summary, the transfer of prisoners to mental
institutions is much more than a mere administra-
tive relocation within the penal system. The trans-
fer actually results in a significant deprivation of
physical, psychic and reputational interests. Since
the due process clause is designed to protect against
deprivations to liberty, the prisoner must be af-
forded procedural safeguards which comport with
constitutional due process standards, before his
transfer can be decreed legal.
What Process Is Due?
Once the due process clause is triggered, the
procedural safeguards required by the particular
factual circumstances must be determined. "The
interpretation and application of the Due Process
clause are intensely practical matters and ...
'[the very nature of d ue process negates any con-
cept of inflexible procedures universally applicable
to every imaginable situation'., 76 The Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that the deter-
mination of what process is due turns on a balanc-
Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-
Criminals by the Dept. of Correction of the State of New York, 17
BUFF. L. REv. 651, 652 (1968).
74 Rosenhan, supra note 32, at 389-90:
A psychiatric label has a life and an influence of its
own. Once the impression has been formed that the
patient is schizophrenic, the expectation is that he
will continue to be schizophrenic. When a sufficient
amount of time has passed, during which the patient
has done nothing bizarre, he is considered to be in
remission and available for discharge. But the label
endures beyond discharge, with the unconfirmed
expectation that he will behave as a schizophrenic
again.
Id. at 389.
75 Id. at 390-91 (footnotes omitted).76 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975).
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ing of competing interests 77 and on an interpreta- the side of strict procedural safeguards.ss The
tion of the rudimentary concepts of fundamental states' interest in streamlined criminal commit-
fairness:
"Due Process" is an elusive concept. Its exact
boundaries are undefinable, and its context varies
according to specific factual contexts.... [As a
generalization, it can be said that due process em-
bodies the differing rules offair play, which through
the years have become associated with differing
types of proceedings.
78
Despite the amorphous character of due process,
the Court has established certain "benchmarks
' 79
deemed necessary to ensure fairness and "provide
a meaningful hedge against erroneous action."8
'
Among these benchmarks is the concept that due
process requires for deprivation of life, liberty or
property to be "preceded by notice and opportu-
nity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.
8 1
In addition to notice and the opportunity to be
heard, there are other "quasi-fundamentals" which
the Court has indicated will be required in nearly
every instance:
In almost every setting where important decisions
turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.... [Moreover], "[tjhe right to be heard
would be, in miny cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. ' 82
The balance of interests involved in a criminal
commitment includes a number of factors which
should cause the judicial scale to weigh heavily on
77 Id at 579.
78 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). "Due
process is that which comports with the deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental
the beliefs are the less likely they are to be explicitly
stated," Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 578.
sIol at 583.
81 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). As evidence that even these seemingly
immutable requisites are not absolute, however, see In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), where the Court
for the first time found that a deprivation was involved
(corporal punishment of students by teachers) of suffi-
cient magnitude to trigger the due process clause, and
yet held that due process was satisfied without any hear-
ing on the propriety vel non of that deprivation (the
student would receive only apost-deprivation opportunity
to be heard on the limited issue of whether the punish-
ment meted out was excessive; and even this would have
to be initiated by the student by way of a subsequent
remedial suit for damages).
82 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970).
ment procedures which allow prison administrators
vast discretion is minimal. The states' major con-
cern is that the administrative cost of a full adver-
sary hearing would be staggering in terms of both
time and money.8' However, this is insufficient
justification, standing alone, for the denial of rigid
procedural safeguards. In Stanley v. Illinois's the
Court noted that:
[t]he establishment of prompt efficacious procedures
to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional ad-
judication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.8
The fact that full adversary hearings are cur-
rently mandated in criminal commitment proceed-
ings in a significant number of states, amply dem-
onstrates that stringent procedural safeguards are
administratively feasible and not prohibitively ex-
pensive.8
7
It has been argued that the state has another
83 Indeed the severe mental oppression to which the
individual is subjected as a result of commitment, both
civil and criminal, has led one legal scholar to the con-
clusion that "the ultimate objective ... [should be] to
abolish institutional psychiatry... altogether. One either
opens the doors of the institution or erects such imposing
legal protections against involuntary commitment as to
make it impossible to lock the doors." Shaffer, supra note
44, at 371.
84 This floodgates argument was made in United States
ex rel. Schuster v. Herold. 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). The court rejected the argu-
ment noting. "When measured against the possibility
that persons committed ... summarily... were wrongly
subjected to the horrors of a prison for the insane, any
inconvenience is... small by comparison. If we open any
"floodgate" today, which we doubt, it is only to provide
a flood of long-overdue relief." Id. at 1087.
.. 4 0 5 U.S. 645 (1972).
" Id. at 656. See also, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (legislative action undertaken "solely
for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily ... involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legis-
lative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]'.").
87 See the criminal commitment statutes of the seven-
teen liberal states cited in note 9, supra, but especially
ILL.. REV. STIwrT ch. 38 § 1003-8-5, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 14.800 (1000) el seq., and N.C. GEN. S'r'. § 122.85 and
§ 122.58.1 et seq.
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interest in streamlined commitment procedures.
Under its police power the state has an interest in
protecting third parties from the alleged mentally
ill individual, and under its parens patriae power an
interest in protecting this individual from himself.
Therefore, to the extent that rigorous procedures
"may impair the state's ability to commit a person
who falls within [state commitment] standards, the
state has an interest in preventing its adoption." s
However, this argument is fallacious in several
respects. For one thing, the state's interest in pro-
tecting the community from the mentally ill indi-
vidual may be "infringed by procedures which
may increase the likelihood of error, such as the
recognition of a right to remain silent, but not by
those procedures designed only to increase the
accuracy of the factfinding process, such as the
provision of a hearing on the merits. ' ' s9 Moreover,
prisons are by their very nature controlled environ-
ments. The possibility that a mentally disturbed
prisoner may harm his fellow inmates is substan-
tially minimized by prison security. If indeed the
prisoner does pose a danger to fellow inmates, an
emergency commitment procedure could be estab-
lished whereby the full adversary hearing is post-
poned.90 Finally, streamlined criminal commit-
ment procedures, and indeed criminal commit-
ment itself, cannot be justified by benevolent pro-
testations that the commitment is for the prisoner's
own well-being. Patients in mental institutions do
not receive adequate treatment and their condition
is more likely to be exacerbated than ameliorated
by their commitment. 9' This is particularly true
with respect to committed prisoners inevitably
placed in maximum security wards where mere
custodial confinement is the rule rather than the
exception.
92
In contrast to the nature of the state's interest,
the prisoner's interests involved in criminal com-
mitment proceedings are immense. As previously
noted, his liberty is gravely jeopardized, and he
stands to suffer significantly if committed.93 More-
'3 Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally 11, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1272 (1974).
89 Id., (footnotes omitted), (emphasis added).
90 Such emergency commitment procedures have long
been utilized in civil commitment. See, e.g., ILL. REV.
ST'r. ch. 91 , § 7-1 et seq.
9' See notes 66-68, supra, and accompanying text;
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1975).
92 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d at
1076: Dixon v. Att'y Gen. of Comm. of Penn., 325 F.
Supp. at 969-70; Morris, supra note 66, at 790; Morris,
supra note 73, at 658-59; T. SZASZ. supra note 42, at
83-84.
93 See notes 25-75, supra, and accompanying text.
over, the weight of his interest in liberty is aug-
mented by the significant possibility of erroneous
commitment. This possibility arises from the ina-
bility of psychiatrists to define and diagnose mental
illness accurately. Psychiatry is an inherently im-
precise "science" 94 because mental health and men-
tal illness are vague, almost meaningless term[s. 95
One need only glance at the diagnostic manual of
the American Psychiatric Association to learn what
an elastic concept mental illness is. It ranges from
massive functional inhibition characteristic of one
form of catatonic schizophrenia to those seemingly
slight aberrancies associated with an emotionally
unstable personality, but which are so close to con-
duct in which we all engage as to define the entire
continuum involved. Obviously the definition of
mental illness is left largely to the user and is
dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he
employs. Usually the use of the phrase "mental
illness" effectively masks the actual norms being
applied. And, because of the unavoidably ambigu-
ous generalities in which the American Psychiatric
Association describes its diagnostic categories, the
diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally
diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever
reason, to put there. 6
This assessment of the concept of mental illness
comports with Dr. Thomas Szasz's belief that men-
tal illness is a "myth,"9 7 something which psychi-
atrists "manufacture" g on the basis of their own
whimsical predelictions of what is morally and
socially acceptable conduct.' The inherent inabil-
ity of psychiatry to distinguish sanity from insanity
is graphically demonstrated by Professor Rosen-
han's study.i°°
The imprecision ofpsychiatry as a "science" is
amplified in the criminal commitment setting be-
cause prison staff physicians who conduct exami-
nations of prisoners typically lack adequate psy-
Psychiatry is perhaps more accurately described as
a "non-science." Roth, Dayley, and Lerner, Into the Abyss:
Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 400, 402-11 (1973) (psychiatric pre-
diction on mental illness is no more accurate than
chance).
95 T. SZASZ, supra note'42, at viii.
9 Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, supra note 34, at
80 (emphasis added), (footnotes omitted); Accord: Roth,
Dayley, and Lemer, supra note 94, at 411.97 T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
9 T. SZAsz. THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970).
" T. SzAsz, supra note 42, at 13-16 (psychiatry is not
a science, it is a value judgment based on the social and
ethical orientations of psychiatrists in which mental ill-
ness is equated with deviance from established social
norms).
'0o Rosenhan, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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chiatric training. 1' Moreover, examinations con-
ducted by prison staff physicians generally consist
of a single ten to fifteen minute interview, which is
hardly conducive to thorough medical diagnosis.'
°2
Furthermore, psychiatry has developed an in-
nate tendency toward overprediction. That is, psy-
chiatrists
operate with a strong bias toward what statisticians
call the type 2 error. This is to say that [they] are
more inclined to call a healthy person sick (a false
positive, type 2) than a sick person healthy (a false
positive, type 1). The reasons for this are not hard
to find: it is clearly more dangerous to misdiagnose
illness than health. Better to err on the side of
caution, to suspect illness even among the
healthy.iD
Overprediction is reinforced in the criminal com-
mitment setting by a number of factors. First,
many psychiatrists equate antisocial criminal be-
havior with psychiatric malady.'(' Consequently,
they are likely to interpret the prisoner's present
incarceration and past prison record as evidence of
psychiatric disorder. Second, the examining psy-
chiatrist may view his recommendation of commit-
ment as being in the prisoner's best interests, since
commitment will afford the prisoner an escape
from the supposed horrors of prison confinement.
Finally, the imprecision and bias toward overpred-
iction inherent in the "science" of psychiatry is not
limited to that profession, but instead is transmit-
ted to the judicial process. It has a significant
impact on the prisoner who is considered for com-
mitment because judges and juries give unques-
tioning deference to the psychiatrists' recommen-
dations and conclusions.2
°5
The nature of psychiatry and its impact on the
criminal commitment process requires observance
of stringent procedural safeguards in the commit-
ment determination. As noted in United States ex rel.
Stachulak v. Coughlin,'O° "[i]f the disparate opinions
of psychiatrists and the vagaries of proof and pre-
diction suggest anything, it is the desirability of the
utmost care in reaching the commitment deci-
sion. ' ' Thus, it is imperative that a full adversary
'' Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 65.
'o2 Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally, Ill, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 822, 848 (1967).
103 Rosenhan, supra note 32, at 385. Accord Roth, Day-
Icy, and Lerner, supra note 94, at 430 (psychiatrists "[play]
it safe" by recommending continued commitment even
"where the examination established nothing.").
'o4T. SzAsz, supra note 42, at 92, 212-13.
'
05 See note 26, infra, and accompanying text.
106 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
947 (976).
1 Id. at 936. See also, note 82 supra.
hearing be afforded the prisoner prior to commit-
ment. The prisoner should be granted the right to
trial by jury, the right to be present and confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to be
represented by counsel.
Some psychiatric scholars maintain that a full-
blown hearing may have a traumatic effect on the
"patient" and exacerbate his condition. From this
they have argued that the commitment determi-
nation should be purely medical, excluding the
judicial process altogether.'0 However, given the
potential abuse of psychiatric power, this result
must be avoided if individual autonomy and integ-
rity is to be preserved. "Above all else, control of
institutions, and of the processes for entering and
leaving them, has to be taken away from the
doctors."' 0 9 The due process clause is designed to
protect against this very type of arbitrary and
discretionary action.
In addition to a full adversary hearing, certain
other precautions are necessary. First, the prisoner
should be entitled to independent psychiatric ex-
amination by a court-selected psychiatrist or a
panel of psychiatrists. However, considering the
imprecision which inheres in the "science" of psy-
chiatry, psychiatric evidence must not be accorded
conclusive weight. Rather, it "must be limited ...
to a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for
commitment."" 0 Second, if the hearing results in
a commitment order, periodic review of that order
should be required. This review must be more than
a mere administrative glance at the individual's
file and a short interview by the staff psychiatrist,
and should consider whether continued hospitali-
zation is needed.
Finally, the prisoner should not be committed
unless it is unequivocally shown that he is in need
of psychiatric treatment, that he will receive such
treatment, and that failure to initiate treatment
will pose a clear and present danger of physical
harm to the prisoner or to others. No individual
should be involuntarily committed merely because
his behavior is annoying or incomprehensible to
others. The belief that treatment will benefit the
prisoner is insufficient justification for commit-
ment. The age of state-enforced therapeutic pater-
nalism should become history.
08 E.g., H. DAVIDSOM. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 281-82
(1965). See also, ILL REV. STATn ch. 91 § 9-4; ME. REv.
STAT. tit. 34 § 2334; S.C. CODE § 44-17-570; TENN.
CODE ANN. § '33-707(d).09 Shaffer, supra note 44, at 371.
o Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, supra note 34,
at 80.
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CRIMINAL COMMITMENT AND THE EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CLAUSE
In marked contrast to the procedurally deficient
criminal commitment legislation found in most
states,"' lie the state civil commitment statutes.
Unlike the criminal commitment statutes, civil in-
voluntary commitment statutes strive to safeguard
the potential patient's interests at each stage of the
proceedings." 2 The Illinois statutory scheme is typ-
ical of those in general use throughout the
nation.11
3
Civil commitment procedures in Illinois14 can
be initiated by any person eighteen years or older
filing a petition with the court, asserting that an
individual is in need of mental treatment. The
court then appoints a physician to examine the
individual, if such an examination has not already
occurred within seventy-two hours of the filing of
the petition. A copy of the petition and the court
order of examination must be personally delivered
to the individual, his attorney, and the individual's
two nearest relatives at least thirty-six hours before
the examination.
If the examining physician certifies to the court
within seventy-two hours of the examination that
the individual is in need of mental treatment and
he sets forth the reasons supporting this conclusion,
the court sets the matter for a hearing. This hearing
must be held not more than five business days after
the court's receipt of the petition and the certificate
of the examining physician. Notice of the time and
place of the hearing must be given to the individual
and to such other persons as the court deems
appropriate. Jury trial on the question of need for
mental treatment can be demanded by the individ-
ual, his spouse, any relative or friend, or an attor-
ney appearing for any of them. If no jury trial is
demanded, the court hears the matter.
The court then appoints one or more examining
physicians to conduct independent personal ex-
aminations and to file detailed reports regarding
the individual's need for mental treatment. The
patient is entitled to be present at the hearing
unless the court finds that his presence would
.. See note 6-12 and accompanying text, supra.
112 But as to whether even these seemingly laudable
procedures are in fact sufficient in light of the dangers
with which involuntary commitment is frought, see pp.
5-22, supra.
113 For a detailed review and analysis of civil commit-
ment procedures throughout the nation see, Developments
in the Law, supra note 29; Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Lessard v. Schmidt, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 1276
(1974).
11 ILL Ri-v. Srxr. ch. 91 §§ 8-1 to 10-8.
constitute a serious danger to his physical or emo-
tional well-being. He is to be represented by legal
counsel, to have counsel appointed if he is indigent,
to have the testimony of at least one of the exam-
ining physicians given at the hearing, and to have
a record of the hearing kept. If the hearing results
in a finding that the individual is in need of mental
treatment or is mentally retarded, the court orders
hospitalization, but only after a determination that
no alternative form of care or treatment (such as
care by relatives) is available.
Procedures for discharge are numerous. First, the
court order of hospitalization is valid for only a one
year period. Any hospitalization after this one year
period requires a new court order after another
hearing with all the procedural guaranties of the
initial hearing. Second, the individual may at any
time file a petition for discharge accompanied by
his own physician's certificate that he is no longer
in need of mental treatment. Third, the superin-
tendent of the hospital is required to conduct an
examination of the patient and review the need for
continued hospitalization at least every six months.
If he concludes that the individual does not need
further mental treatment, the superintendent is
required to grant him absolute discharge. Finally,
at least once during the patient's first year of
hospitalization and at least once in every two year
period thereafter, the superintendent is required to
file a written report with Department of Mental
Health "setting forth the reasons supporting the
need for further hospitalization." ' 5 He is also re-
quired to give notice of this report to the patient,
his attorney, his nearest relative, and two other
persons designated by the patient. In this notice,
the superintendent must also set forth the right of
the patient and of any person on the patient's
behalf to request a hearing on the need for further
hospitalization. At this hearing, which must be
conducted within ten days of the request, the in-
dividual is entitled to all the procedural guaranties
of the initial hearing.
The Illinois civil commitment procedures exem-
plify the elaborate framework for safeguards which
has been imposed upon the state in the civil com-
mitment process. Noting the existence of these
elaborate civil statutes, a number of federal courts
have recently considered whether the lax criminal
commitment procedures violate the equal protec-
tion clause. Relying heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Baxstrom,n6 these courts have
,'5 Id., § 10-2.
,'6 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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concluded that such criminal statutes cannot with-
stand such equal protection attack.
In Baxstroma, the petitioner had been convicted of
second degree assault and sentenced to a maximum
prison term of three years. While incarcerated, he
was certified insane by a prison physician and
transferred to Dannemora, the New York state
mental institution for the criminally insane. Upon
the expiration of his prison term, the petitioner was
civilly committed under a special statutory proce-
dure for commitment of prisoners, which did not
allow de novo review by a jury on the queston of
sanity vel non, as was provided for by statute in the
civil commitment of all other persons. The Court
held that this procedure -violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment because
it believed that the disparate treatment of ex-pris-
oners was irrational. As the Court maintained:
Equal protection does not require that all persons
be dealt with identically, but it does require that a
distinction made have some relevance to the pur-
pose for which the classification is made.... Clas-
sification of mentally ill persons as either insane or
dangerously insane [i.e. criminally insane] of course
may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of
determining the type of custodial or medical care to
be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the
context of the opportunity to know whether a
person is mentally ill at alL For purposes of granting
judicial review before ajury of the question whether
a person is mentally ill and in need of institution-
alization, there is no conceivable basis for distin-
guishing the commitment of a person who is nearing
the end of a penal term from all other civil com-
mitments.
17
The Court's holding in Baxstrom was limited to
equal protection as it relates to the procedures for
continued commitment of prisoners after their
prison sentences have expired. Although the Court
has declined to extend that holding, the underlying
rationale of Baxstrom applies with equal strength to
the commitment of prisoners during their prison
sentence." 8 The fact that an individual has been
convicted of a crime is a wholly irrelevant consid-
eration in determining the commitment procedures
n1 d. at 111-12 (emphasis in original).
"8 The Court has had ample opportunity to decide the
issue but has thus far refrained from doing so. It denied
certiorari in United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold; 410
F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969), and
in Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970), which are discussed at
length infra. Moreover, in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972), the Court took note of the holdings in Schuster
and Matthews, but declined to decide the issue.
to be applied to that individual. As one lower
federal court has explained Baxstrom:
The Supreme Court struck down the New York
system not because Baxstrom was reaching the end
of his sentence, but because it held dangerousness is
not relevant to the procedures for determining
whether "a person is mentally ill at all."... Baxstroa
thus might be said to require the conclusion that,
while prior criminal conduct is relevant to the de-
termination whether a person is mentally ill and
dangerous, it cannot justify denial of procedural
safeguards for that determination." 9
This reasoning has prompted several other fed-
eral courts to hold that procedures for committing
prison inmates before the expiration of their sen-
tences, which are inferior to generally applicable
civil commitment procedures, violate equal protec-
tion.
The first such holding came in United States ex
rel. Schuster v. Herold.'2° In that case the petitioner
Schuster was convicted in 1931 of second degree
murder and sentenced to a prison term of from
twenty-five years to life. Ten years after his convic-
tion, Schuster was transferred to Dannemora."
21
According to his petition for habeas corpus, Schuster
believed that many of the prison officials were
"'Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 201 (D.C. Cir.
1967). See also, United States ex rel Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d at 1081, discussed at length infra, where the
Court concluded:
Baxstror clearly instructs that the procedures to be
followed in determining whether one is committable
must be unaffected by the irrelevant circumstance
that one is or has recently been under sentence
pursuant to a criminal conviction, although the fact
that one has committed a crime may be relevant to
the substantive conclusion that he is mentally ill.
(emphasis in original); and Association of the Bar, City
of New York, Special Committee on the Study of Com-
mitment Procedures and Law Relating to Incompetents,
Second Report, Due Process and the Criminal Defendant
1 (1968): "The basic and unifying thread which runs
throughout our recommendations is a rejection of the
notion that the mere fact of a criminal charge or convic-
tion is a proper basis upon which to build other unnec-
essary, unprofitable, and essentially unfair distinctions
among the mentally ill."
. '20410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847
(1969).
121 Schuster was committed under N.Y. Correc. Law
§ 383 (McKinney) which provided for automatic transfer
upon certification of insanity by a single prison official.
This statute was repealed in 1965 and replaced with §
408, which has since been revised in light of the court's
holding in Schuster. The procedures for criminal commit-
ment are now contained in § 402, and are substantially
the same as those applied to civil commitment.
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corrupt and that he was being transferred because
he had voiced his objections to this corruption 22
On this basis alone, the certifying physician con-
cluded that Schuster was paranoid and mentally
ill, and that he thus should be committed.12
Schuster languished in Dannemora from 1941 to
1975.'24 Although he would have been eligible for
parole in 1948, this privilege was denied to him
solely because of his commitment. 2 5 The court
found that Schuster had received no treatment for
his "condition" in all his years at Dannemora,
2 6
and that Schuster was not a dangerous individual
in need of the custodial detention Dannemora
offered. Thus, the court was; "forced to the un-
happy conclusion that Schuster was simply a for-
gotten man in a mental institution which had
nothing to offer him ... and [was] able to keep his
equilibrium only through his own efforts and his
122 This allegation appears, from the facts set forth by
the court, to be quite believable. See notes 138 and 144
infra.
3 Schuster testified at the hearing before the federal
district judge on his petition for habeas corpus that the
1941 conversation with the staff physicians was brief in
duration, that the "doctors devoted most of their 'diag-
nostic' efforts to persuading him to recant his charges,"
that he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
the doctors nor to rebut the "diagnosis" with evidence of
his sanity, that neither of the doctors had any training in
psychiatry, that he was forced to sign a transcript of the
conversation without being allowed to read it, and that
he was not permitted legal counsel although he had
requested adjournment of the proceedings in order to
secure representation. See 410 F.2d at 1075-76.
124 Although the court held that Schuster's commit-
ment was unconstitutional, it ordered only that Schuster
be granted a hearing on the question of his sanity. The
state, however, inexcusably delayed action on the order
and the court was forced to hear the case again. This
time the court held that in light of the state's flagrant
violation of the spirit of its previous order and the prior
unconstitutional acts of the state, Schuster was to be
absolutely discharged. United States ex. rel Schuster v.
Vincent, 524 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975).
125 The court noted that "[w]hile, theoretically, the
Parole Board has authority to parole Schuster directly
from Dannemora ... in practice the Board does not
parole anyone who is incarcerated in a mental institution
for the presumption is that he is mentally ill." 410 F.2d
at 1076 n.3.
126 "The reason for this apparent neglect according to
... [the] assistant director of Dannemora, [was] that
Schuster's paranoia [was] so 'deeply rooted' that it would
not respond to therapy." 410 F.2d at 1076. The court
indicated that had Schuster raised the question of his
constitutional right to treatment in the state courts, it
would have held that such a right does indeed exist and
ihat Schuster had been deprived of it. See 410 F.2d at
1087-89, and the discussion of the right to treatment at
notes 64 and 68, supra.
hope that he [was] preparing himself 127 for the day
when he would be released. ' ' 12s
Schuster challenged the legality of his commit-
ment on equal protection grounds, contending that
he was not afforded the same procedural rights
allowed to civilians in contesting involuntary com-
mitment. He prayed that he be returned to prison
where he would be eligible for parole or "at least
be removed from the grievously distressing atmo-
sphere of an institution ... which houses the in-
sane."
129
The court, in analyzing the legality of Schuster's
commitment, first noted the deleterious efforts
which had resulted from the transfer to Danne-
mora: the increased restraints upon his liberty, the
increased indignities, and the "physical, emotional,
and general mental agony"' 3 to which he had
127 Schuster was not assigned work at Dannemora. He
testified that his spare time was spent studying so that he
would be prepared "to step into an honorable job" upon
his release. 410 F.2d at 1076.
'28410 F.2d at 1076. Indeed, it is very questionable
whether Schuster was suffering any psychological dis-
turbance at all. The court set forth at great length the
findings of the state's psychiatrist in a prior state pro-
ceeding on one of Schuster's previous petitions for habeas
corpus:
At the 1963 state hearing, only one psychiatrist, a
Dr. Carson, testified. He admitted that Schuster
was "an individual whose conduct in general is
correct, who uses impeccable logic" and that "he
shows no obvious signs of mental illness such as
deterioration, untidiness, hallucinatory experiences,
bizarre ideas or bizarre behavior." Nonetheless, Dr.
Carson concluded that Schuster was mentally ill
since he had a paranoid condition. "This is the type
of illness," Carson explained, "in which an entire
delusional but logical belief is based on a single false
premise, and if one allows the truth of the false
premises the patient's behavior no longer appears
abnormal***" Dr. Carson conceded that while he
could believe cheating took place in the Regents'
examinations in the prison, and that prison officials
would be reluctant to have depositions submitted
to that effect, he could not believe that anyone
would commit a man to a hospital for the criminally
insane because of it. Accordingly, he concluded that
Schuster must be insane. He was unmoved by Schuster's
claim, which the state did not deny, that the prison
warden, chief clerk and controller had been dis-
missed shortly after Schuster made his charges of
corruption. (emphasis added)
Id. at 1077. Indeed, the court questioned the validity of
this psychiatrist's findings: "The insubstantiality of that
doctor's testimony may be characterized as follows:
Schuster believes in corruption. I don't believe such
corruption exists, ergo Schuster is insane." 410 F.2d at
1085.




been exposed. The court then compared the pro-
cedures utilized in Schuster's commitment with
those provided for civil involuntary commitment.
While Schuster was committed solely on the basis
of a single prison physician's certification of insan-
ity without any kind of hearing or judicial review,
the court noted that a civilian at that time could
not be committed without examination by two
qualified examiners, notice of the commitment
proceedings, a judicial hearing on the question of
sanity with the right to cross-examine witnesses,
and a court order of commitment.1"1 Consequently,
the court, relying on Baxstrom, held that the sub-
stantial disparity between the civil procedures and
those under which Schuster was committed, did
indeed violate the principles of equal protection.
As the court maintained:
Bzxstrom clearly instructs that the procedures to be
followed in determining whether one is committable
must be unaffected by the irrelevant circumstance
that one is or has recently been under sentence
pursuant to a criminal conviction, although the fact
that one has committed a crime may be relevant to
the substantive conclusion that he is mentally ill."
The court ordered that Schuster be given a
hearing on the question of his sanity with substan-
tially all the procedural safeguards then afforded
to civilians in involuntary commitment proceed-
ings. If that hearing resulted in a determination
that Schuster was sane, he was to be returned to
prison.1
3
After Schuster, the constitutionality of criminal
commitment procedures was again at issue in Mat-
thews v. Hardy."3 In that case, the appellant Mat-
thews was convicted of manslaughter in 1965 and
sentenced to a prison term of from four to fourteen
years. After serving a year and a half of this
sentence, he was transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital pursuant to a District of Columbia statute
which provided for commitment of a prisoner upon
13 The court noted that the procedures followed at the
time of its opinion provided for essentially the same
procedures as 1941 civil commitment did. However, civil
commitment procedures in New York had since then
improved substantially. Id. at 1083.
"2 Id. at 1081 (emphasis in original).
'33 Circuit Judge Moore, dissenting, would have de-
ferred to the state determinations of Schuster's insanity
and need for confinement in a mental institution. He
criticized the majority for its judicial legislation and
interference in New York's administration of its laws and
prisons.
'm 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1010 (1970).
the belief of the Director of the Department of
Correction that the prisoner is mentally ill, fol-
lowed by the concurrence of a psychiatrist. s Con-
sequently, Matthews did not receive a hearing
prior to his commitment. The psychiatrist's con-
currence in the finding of mental illness was made
on the basis of a mere ten-minute interview with
Matthews. In contrast to this "streamlined proce-
dure, ' ' 1a6 the civil commitment procedures in the
District of Columbia were much more demanding.
The civilian facing civil commitment was entitled
to judicial hearing, jury trial upon request, ap-
pointed counsel, periodic review of the commit-
ment order, and independent psychiatric exami-
nation-without cost if he was indigent.3
In finding for Matthews on the equal protection
question, the court was unpersuaded by the gov-
ernment's argument that Matthews' transfer was
"an administrative matter ... resting within the
sound discretion of the prison authorities.' ' ts8 The
Court stated that administrative discretion was not
unlimited, but that it must give way to "para-
mount federal constitutional ... rights,"'1 9 such as
equal protection of the law. The stigma confronted
by the mentally ill, the ,significantly increased re-
strictions upon the transferees' eligibility for parole,
and the "severe emotional and psychic harm" that
commitment could engender,' 40 led the court to
conclude that
incarceration in a mental institution is sufficiently
different from incarceration in a prison [as] to re-
quire the same or similar safeguards [as allowed in
civil commitment]....
These factors make it understandable that many
prisoners would fiercely resist being moved out of a
prison into a mental hospital. We think the differ-
ences in the two types of incarceration are simply
too great to treat transfer to a mental hospital as a
routine administrative procedure.14 1
The court therefore followed the lead of the
Schuster court and held that statutory provisions for
criminal commitment procedures which are sub-
stantially inferior to procedures employed in civil
involuntary commitment, violate equal protection.
135 24 D.C. CODE § 302.
'- 420 F.2d at 609.
137 21 D.C. CODE § 501 et seq.
'- 420 F.2d at 610.
139 Id., quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486
(1969).
140Id. at 611. See pp. 5-22, supra, dealing with the
significant deprivation which criminal commitment en-
tails.
4 Id. at 610-11.
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However, in contrast to the Schuster court, the
Matthews court did not hold the challenged crimi-
nal commitment statute uncohstitutional. Instead,
the court read the civil commitment procedural
safeguards into the criminal commitment statute
to save that statute's constitutionality.
In addition to the criminal commitment proce-
dures in New York and in the District of Columbia,
the criminal commitment statutes in several.other
jurisdictions have been subjected to equal protec-
tion scrutiny and have failed that test. These juris-
dictions include Connecticut, 4 2 Pennsylvania, 4 3
West Virginia,'4 and Massachusetts. 4 5 Thus, it
can be forcefully argued that criminal commitment
statutes which provide for transfer of prisoners to
mental institutions under "streamlined
142 In Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Supp. 887 (D. Conn.
1974), affid, 508 F.2d 836 (1975), CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17-194a, which provided for transfer of a prisoner to a
mental institution upon certification by a physician that
the prisoner was mentally ill, was held unconstitutional.
The court relied heavily upon Baxstrom, Schuster, and
Matthews in holding that equal protection had been
denied. CONN. GEN. STATr. § 17-194c now provides that
civil commitment procedures will be followed in criminal
commitment.
'43 In United States ex rel Souder v. Watson, 413 F.
Supp. 711 (M.D. Pa. 1976), the court held unconstitu-
tional 50 PA. CONS. Srxr. § 4411, which provided for
judicial determination of commitment upon petition of
the prison warden, but did not provide for personal
notice, presence of the prisoner at the hearing, nor legal
counsel, all of which were provided for in civil commit-
ment proceedings. That statute was subsequently, re-
pealed and replaced with § 7401(a), which provides for
the application of civil commitment procedures.
'44 In Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W.
Va. 1976), W. VA. CODE § 28-5-31, (not yet been re-
pealed or revised) which provides for transfer to a mental
hospital for 30 days observation when. in the warden's
opinion a prisoner has become mentally ill, and for
commitment if the hospital examining board finds him
mentally ill, was held to contravene both the equal
piotection and due process clauses.
'4 See Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 254
N.E.2d 779 (1969) where the court ruled on the consti-
tutionality of the commitment of a prisoner under MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 § 105 (West), which provided
for commitment of an individual charged with or con-
procedure[s],"' 14 making the commitment deter-
mination largely a matter of administrative discre-
tion, are unconstitutional on equal protection as
well as on due process grounds.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the
transfer of a prisoner to a mental institution con-
stitutes much more than a mere administrative
relocation of that prisoner within the penal system.
Criminal commitment engenders severe depriva-
tions of individual liberty. Freedom from bodily
constraints, from mental and emotional oppression,
and from damage to reputational interests is jeop-
ardized. Thus, due process necessitates the observ-
ance of procedural safeguards in criminal commit-
ment proceedings to ensure that the commitment
determination is not arbitrarily and erroneously
made. Furthermore, the equal protection clause
demands that these procedural safeguards be at
least as stringent in their protection of the rights of
the individual as the procedures utilized in the civil
commitment process.
Yet despite these clear constitutional mandates,
criminal commitment in the vast majority of states
is statutorily left to the absolute discretion of prison
officials in conjunction with prison staff physicians.
This fact alarmingly demonstrates the urgent need
for reform. The states' interests in administrative
convenience and efficiency are subordinate to the
individual's interests in liberty. Thus, the criminal
commitment decision must forever be removed
from "the domain of the correctional offi-
cials . ... 147
JOSEPH F. LOOK
victed of a crime. In order to avoid holding that section
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection, the
court read into it the more rigorous procedural safeguards
provided for in civil commitment proceedings.
146 Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 609 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
147 Note, The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisoners: A New
Look at Due Process for Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1277,
1297 (1975).
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